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This paper addresses the theoretical and descriptive relevance of pragmatic 
inference with the purpose of exploring the syntax-semantics interface in 
secondary predication in English. Most standard syntactic analyses proceed 
on the assumption that there is a uniform, one-to-one correspondence of the 
postverbal NP (NP2  henceforth) and the following XP with the semantic 
interpretation of these phrases as direct object and complement/modifier (or 
adjunct), respectively. However, upon closer examination of sentences like 
“I found John gone/out of sight” or “I have a tooth missing”, it appears that 
such an assumption can be challenged on both theoretical and descriptive 
grounds. Since these pragmatically marked predication structures involve 
the cancellation of the conventional implicature of the NP1 V NP2 string, it is 
suggested that the syntactic analysis of these instances cannot be established 
solely on the basis of formal properties alone, but rather needs to be seen in 
terms of the interaction of the inherent meaning and form properties of the 
syntactic constituents of the construction with the actual interpretation of 
these properties by the subject/speaker in a given discourse scenario. At a 
descriptive level, it is argued that these marked instances of secondary 
predication can be more aptly analyzed, both syntactically and semantically, 
as involving complex predicates taking the postverbal NP2 as their sole 
object argument.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Standard syntactic analyses of secondary predication,1 whether of a formal or 
functional nature, usually proceed on the shared assumption that there is a 
one-to-one correspondence between the expected semantic interpretation of a 
syntactic constituent and its actual interpretation. Thus, consider (1) below: 
 
(1) “I found John sad/naked/gone” (Example created by the author and 
approved by native informants) 
 
 While the first two configurations imply, in varying degrees, some 
sort of direct experiential perception of “John”2 (i.e. When I found John, he 
                                                     
* The research reported here was supported by the Xunta de Galicia, grant number 
PGIDT00PXI20402PR, research project Análise do discurso na lingua inglesa: Aspectos 
sincrónicos e contrastivos con referencia ó galego o mailo castelán and Sintaxis contrastiva 
inglés-español (BFF 2000-1271), sponsored by the Spanish Ministry of Education. I would 
like to thank Prof. Christopher S. Butler (University of Wales-Swansea) and Prof. E. Varela 
Bravo (University of Vigo) for offering extremely valuable feedback on an earlier draft of this 
paper. Any remaining errors are, of course, my entire responsibility. 
1 The term “secondary predicate” will be understood here in the sense outlined, among others, 
in Aarts (1995:75), that is, as “phrases which are predicated of a constituent which stands in a 
thematic relation to the main verb of the sentence (…), typically a direct object.” 
Semantically, secondary predicates may be obligatory (e.g. “He considers her intelligent”) or 
optional (e.g. “She likes her soup cold”). Semantically, obligatory secondary predicates have 
been analyzed as complements, while optional ones have been treated as modifiers (Dowty 
1972) or object adjuncts (Allerton 1982). Secondary predicates have been syntactically 
analyzed in the literature as small clauses (Chomsky 1981) or as instances of complex-
transitive complementation (Quirk et al 1985). See Aarts (1995) and Cardinaletti & Guasti 
(1995), inter alia, for an account of recent analyses of secondary predication. 
2 See Borkin (1973, 1984) and Gonzálvez (2000) for a semantico-pragmatic characterization 
of secondary predicates selected by cognitive predicates as conveying the speaker´s direct, 
personal experience of the NP XP string. 
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was sad/naked), no such implication can be said to obtain in the case of the 
third, where the lexical semantics of the XP gone in this frame cancels, 
without any immediate evidence as to a difference in syntactic structure, the 
standard pragmatic inference that the subject/speaker actually found John. 
 In view of the puzzling contrasts in interpretation above, two 
important questions arise which will be taken as the main sustaining thread 
in the present paper: (i) What is the theoretical and descriptive relevance of 
pragmatic inference for the interpretation and syntactico-semantic analysis 
of secondary predication in English?, and (ii) how can the cancellation of the 
inference activated by the italicized XP´s in (2)-(3) below be adequately 
accounted for in semantic terms and, accordingly, translated into syntactic 
terms with a view to explaining the putative discrepancy between its formal 
configuration as a modifier and its overtly predication-like function?  
 
(2) “I get home, as I said, to find your mother in tears, Cassie screeching 
on about Jack being dead and your dog being to blame for it and you 
well out of sight” (ICE-GB Corpus, W2F-001-43) 
 
(3)  “You´ve got your arms and legs missing and you´ve got a squint as 
well!” (ICE-GB Corpus, S1B-049-48) 
2. A literature overview of the role of pragmatic inference in the formal 
and functional literature 
2.1. Kirsner and Thompson (1976) 
Kirsner´s & Thompson (1976)´s pioneering work makes a number of 
theoretical and descriptive claims which can be duplicated in some way for  
secondary predication in English. These can be briefly summarised for the 
purposes of this paper as in (i)-(ii) below: 
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(i) The “correct” syntactic analysis of sensory verb constructions is 
less obvious than it first appears, since these sentences are used to 
communicate far more than they actually claim.3 Accordingly, many putative 
properties of sensory verb complements should not be regarded as the 
exclusive by-product of their linguistic structure but can rather be said to 
arise out of PRAGMATIC INFERENCES from (a) knowledge of assumptions 
about the nature of the event/state of affairs/process encoded in the 
complement clause, and (b) the semantic oppositions between the particular 
meanings encoded and other meanings available in the linguistic system.4 
Thus, consider the examples reproduced in (4)(a)-(d) below:5 
 
(4) (a) “We saw the invisible nerve gas kill all the sheep”-/-> (although 
of course, we didn´t actually see the invisible gas nerve itself but the 
sheep dying). 
(b) “We heard the farmer slaughter the pig”-/-> (although of course, 
we didn´t necessarily hear the farmer but the pig screaming” 
(c) “I smelled Sylvia spraying the living room”-/-> (although of 
course, I didn´t necessarily smell Sylvia, but it is very likely that I 
smelled the living room and/or the spray) 
(d) “We heard it thundering”-/-> (although of course, we didn´t hear 
“it” but the thundering) 
 
(ii) With regard to the implications of pragmatic inference so as to 
determine the syntactic status of the NP and the non-finite clause in the case 
of sensory perception complementation, Kirsner & Thompson note the 
                                                     
3 In much the same vein, Levinson (2000: 14) contends that what is CODED by the linguistic 
system is the sum of what is SAID (roughly the truth-conditional content) and what is 
CONVENTIONALLY IMPLICATED. 
4 The term “meaning” is taken here to embrace both lexical meaning and constructional 
meaning (i.e. the semantico-pragmatic contrast, where available, between an encoding  with 
“that”-clause, a non-finite clause, and a verbless clause). 
5  Examples taken from Kirsner & Thompson (1976: 209-210). 
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following: 
(…) Whether the complement subject can be further interpreted as direct 
object depends on whether the event or situation referred to by the 
complement can only be perceived as specified by the sensory verb if the 
referent of the complement subject is so perceived. But this is clearly a 
matter of pragmatics. (Kirsner & Thompson 1976: 158, emphasis added to 
the original). 
An interesting conclusion ensuing from the above is that the 
intervening NP2  usually corresponds to the object of perception, but it is also 
possible, given an adequate supporting context, to perceive an event globally 
without the NP being necessarily perceived. In the words of Gee (1977):6 
(…) With NI-constructions one need not perceive the NP-object, one need 
only perceive the NP. Take the case where John is behind an opaque screen 
where we cannot see him, but we all know he is there. He can, with 
magnets, move small geometrical objects on the front side of the screen 
from the back. I can say, it seems to me, when John moves some objects 
“Now, I can see John moving the little figures”, “I just saw John move one 
of the little figures” (…) (Gee 1977: 474). 
Thus, it can be concluded that the grammar does not necessarily 
characterize the NP as direct object in this frame,7 and, accordingly, the 
syntactico-semantic analysis of these constructions cannot be safely 
established on the basis of formal properties alone,8 but should rather be 
                                                     
6 See Declerck (1982: 12) and Hoekstra (1988: 117-118), among others, for a concomitant 
view on the issue from a generative standpoint.  
7 According to Kirsner & Thompson, this point was first noted by De Geest (1970, 1973). 
8 Dik & Hengeveld (1991) can be taken to be a paradigmatic case in this respect. In 
their discussion of sensory perception complements, they explicitly admit that their previous 
(three-place predicate) analysis “disregarded the counterexamples against the entailment 
condition (…). If these examples [i.e. examples like those in (3) above] are taken into 
account, we have to conclude that [these] are two-place [predicates] after all and that they 
solidly represent the IPSoA case.” (Dik & Hengeveld, 1991: 254, square brackets mine). 
More recently, Felser (1999: 18ff), drawing on evidence from pronominalisation and 
conjunction facts, tough-movement and the distribution of expletives, has concluded that 
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handled in terms of the interaction of the meaning and form properties of the 
linguistic structure, on the one hand, with the actual interpretation of these in 
a given discourse scenario.9 
2.2. Brugman´s (1988, 1999) constructional analysis 
Within the framework of CONSTRUCTION GRAMMAR (CG henceforth),10 
Brugman (1988, 1999) addresses the issue of what appears to be a mismatch 
between the syntactic structure of the XP and its semantico-pragmatic 
interpretation in secondary predication instances like the one in “I have a 
tooth missing”. More specifically, Brugman (1999: 3) tackles the lack of 
isomorphism between both levels of linguistic analysis as follows: 
 
The attribution of missingness to the tooth is expressed by means of  the 
parataxis of missing as a syntactic modifier of tooth; I will argue that 
semantically, missing is a predicate which takes tooth as its argument, 
which is why “I have a tooth missing” is propositionally synonymous with 
(5) and (6), in which missing is also predicated of tooth. The relationship of  
“inalienable possession” between the interested person and the tooth is 
determined on the basis of entailment of the propositional content of the 
sentence in conjunction with extralinguistic knowledge, and is not the 
semantic basis for the construction. 
                                                                                                                            
infinitival perception verb complements exhibit the behaviour of clausal constituents. 
9 The assumption that pragmatic inference is crucial to determine the syntactic and semantic 
properties of a given construction is not accepted by some advocates of an autonomous syntax 
framework (Mendívil Giró 1999: 381ff). Their argument boils down to claiming that 
pragmatic inference operates only at the grammatical output. However, see Matthews (1995) 
and, more recently, Levinson (2000) for some empirical counterarguments against the 
Chomskyan program as a tenable way of thinking about a theory of meaning. More 
specifically, Levinson (2000: 8-9) argues that “pragmatic processes play a crucial role in the 
“correspondence rules” mapping syntactic structures onto semantic representations, and again 
mapping semantic representations onto communicated thoughts or utterance meanings.”  
10 For an outline of the CG framework, see Fillmore & Kay (1988) and Goldberg (1995), inter 
alia. 
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(5) “I have a missing tooth” 
(6) “My tooth is missing”/“One of my teeth is missing” 
At a descriptive level, Brugman contends that missing is a secondary 
predicate (that is, a subcategorised-for predicative complement of the matrix 
verb HAVE) taking the NP a tooth as its argument. Furthermore, Brugman 
stresses the fact the argument of HAVE is not tooth, but rather the proposition 
expressed by the string a tooth missing, as shown in Brugman (1988).11 
3. Pragmatic inference and the syntax-semantics interface 
So far we have outlined a number of formal and functional proposals in 
favour of incorporating pragmatic inference into the syntactic analysis of a 
given construction.12 The question that now arises is whether pragmatic 
inference can be seen as forming part of the semantic component, and in 
turn, of the syntactic system, too. With regard to the former issue, it must be 
emphasized that pragmatic inferences of the type at hand here are in fact 
                                                     
11 In our opinion, the main shortcoming of Brugman´s analysis lies in not being easily 
generalizable to the other marked instances of secondary predication examined here  (e.g. “I 
found John gone/out of sight/missing”), which select an entity reading rather than a 
proposition, and which are not, therefore, propositionally synonymous to any kind of primary 
predication counterpart (e.g. “John is gone”, *“I found a gone John”). See 4.1 for further 
discussion of this point. 
12  In this respect, it must be noted that Jackendoff (1990: 38ff) raises a number of doubts as 
to the viability of formalizing inferences that involve non-logical items, mainly because of the 
difficulty of generalizing among the inferential properties of different lexical items as well as 
finding vocabulary for lexical decomposition that permits significant generalizations. In the 
case of the instances under discussion here, these two shortcomings are overcome in the sense 
that the XP´s involve some negative meaning which can be glossed as “fail to” (e.g. “He 
found John/the book missing/gone” +> “He failed to find the book”) or “no longer” (e.g. “He 
has a tooth missing” +> “He no longer has a tooth”). Therefore, while acknowledging that 
“each item is a world onto itself”, we disagree with Jackendoff when he concludes that “there 
can be no general principles”. See section 4 for an outline of our proposal.  
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akin to what Grice (1975: 44f.) called “conventional implicatures”.13 
However, the problem nonetheless remains as to whether one can separate 
pragmatics from semantics.  
In this respect, Matthews´ (1995: 58) proposal runs as follows:  
Semantics will deal with `linguistic meanings´, with the features that a form 
or construction always has. Pragmatics will then study the further meanings 
that a sentence has for specific individuals in specific contexts of utterance. 
 More specifically, Matthews (1995: 51) proposes a two-fold 
distinction between semantics in a wide sense (`Semantics1´), which is the 
study of meaning; and in a narrow sense (`Semantics2´), which is what is left 
of semantics1 when pragmatics, and, if syntax is included, syntax also, are 
substracted from it. With regard to the latter question, the relationship 
between semantics and syntax, it can be argued that semantic relations are 
also (at least in part) syntactic relations. As Matthews (1995) has put it: 
One problem (…) is to distinguish the “sense relations” that belong to 
syntax from those that would belong to “semantics2”. For example, it might 
be a fact of syntax that persuade has a valency like those of order or ask; 
but a fact of “semantics”, in a narrow sense, that I asked him to leave and I 
persuaded him to leave have different `senses´. But the difficulty is 
precisely that the meanings of words cannot be partitioned in that way. On 
the one hand, one cannot describe meaning independently of distribution, 
and then say that distributions follow from it. (Matthews 1995: 55, 
emphasis added to the original). 
 Therefore, if the above line of reasoning is accepted, it follows that a 
cut-and-dried division between syntax, semantics and pragmatics should not 
                                                     
13  However, it must be recalled, as Levinson (2000: 14) notes, that “pragmatic inference is 
the outcome of a set of rather different kinds of pragmatic principles.”  
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be retained, and that pragmatic inference can be plausibly subsumed under 
the semantic representation14 and be regarded as being relevant to the 
syntactic component.15 
4. Pragmatic inference and complex predicates 
In this section we shall attempt to demonstrate that a complex predicate 
analysis16 makes a sound solution at both a theoretical and descriptive level 
to account for the “discrepant” readings of the italicised XP´s below in the 
secondary predication frame:17 
 
(5) (a) “He rushed downstairs, examined the wallet and found £2  
missing” (BNC Corpus, B24 1131)  
 (b) “I´ve got a tooth missing now” (BNC Corpus, KBW 2204) 
 
In what follows, we shall briefly pinpoint a number of semantic 
                                                     
14 Levinson (2000: 231) goes as far as to claim that pragmatic inferences may “end up 
embedded in semantic representations or their interpretations”, which he refers to as 
´intrusion´.  
15 This view is commonly accepted in functionally-oriented linguistic models in 
general, and CG in particular, where no strict division is posited between grammar and the 
lexicon. An outstanding exception in this respect is Levinson (2000: 9), who argues that “we 
should think about both semantics and pragmatics as being component processes which offer 
their own distinctive contributions to a single level of representation. The processes remain 
distinct in kind, and thus the distinction between pragmatics and semantics must be retained.” 
(emphasis added to the original). 
16 The complex predicate analysis goes back as far as to Chomsky (1955/75). We are using 
this concept here in a theory-neutral fashion that could be taken to be compatible with a 
formal or functional model. See Alsina, Bresnan & Sells (1997) and Ackerman & Webelhuth 
(1998) for an outline of competing motivations and applications of this concept. See also 
Contreras (1995) and Rapoport (1995) for an account of the latest implementations of this 
analysis within the generative framework.  
17 It should be emphasized that we are concerned here exclusively with instances in which the 
XP obligatorily cancels the conventional implication of the primary predication, thus leaving 
out instances of the type “You have your bread to earn”, where, as Jespersen (1940: 226) 
comments, “the meaning may even be `you have no bread´), or “You have a pound to pay”, 
which may imply that “he does not have a pound” (Palmer 1988: 53).  
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and syntactic motivations for a complex predicate analysis of these marked 
instances of secondary predication. 
1. The sentences in (5)(a)-(b) exhibit a semantic clash between the existence 
or possession meaning of the NP1 V NP2 sequence, which implies the 
subject/speaker´s perceptual report of, or a possession of the entity encoded 
in the NP2, with that of the XP, which cancels the conventional implication 
of the sequence concerned. Thus, a sentence such as “He found two pounds 
missing” does not by any means implicate “He found two pounds”, and so 
forth. It must be emphasized that the semantic incompatibility holds at both a 
lexical and constructional level. It is lexical because there is a “conflict” 
between the existence or possession meaning of the matrix verbs (e.g. FIND, 
HAVE, SEE) with the non-existence or non-possession meaning of the XP´s 
(e.g. “gone”, “out of sight”, “absent”, “missing”, “lacking”). Moreover, it is 
constructional because the incompatibility holds when the XP´s occur in the 
secondary predication frame, and not in most instances of primary 
predication (e.g. “John is gone”) or modification structures (“e.g. “I found 
the missing pages”+> “I found the pages”), 18 where no such discrepant 
readings hold between the syntax and semantics of these configurations. 
Accordingly, a syntactic analysis of the NP2 as direct object of the 
matrix verb FIND would appear to be at best semantically inadequate. On the 
other hand, the small clause analysis, which treats the NP2 and the XP 
together as the sole argument of the matrix verb, appears to be semantically 
unmotivated, too. Notice, incidentally, that these matrix verbs select an 
entity reading rather an state of affairs, as shown by the fact that these matrix 
verbs never allow, in these marked predication instances, a clausal 
complement in the NP2 or XP slots.19 
 
(6) (a) * “I found it gone” :: “I found it evident that John had gone” 
                                                     
18  The notation +>, taken from Levinson (2000), is taken to stand for “implicates” throughout 
this paper. 
19 See Williams (1997: 13ff) for a similar use of extraposition as a diagnostic for complex 
predicate formation. 
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(b) * “I had it two pages be missing” 
 
Moreover, if those XP´s which activate the cancellation of the 
implicature occur in the secondary predication frame with a matrix verb 
which unequivocally selects a state of affairs (alias propositional) reading, 
no such cancellation can be observed, as illustrated in (7) below: 
   
(7) (a) “The following limestone routes have been listed missing in 
despatches, so don´t come crying to us if you can´t find them” (BNC 
Corpus, A15 189) :: +> “The routes have been listed, but they may 
not be found” 
  
2. The matrix verbs and XP´s which give rise to the cancellation of 
the implicature exhibit robust semantic restrictions which can be 
accounted for in a natural and elegant way if a complex predicate 
analysis is invoked. Moreover, the lexical items in question can be 
said to form in a way a semantically homogeneous group composed 
of semantically impoverished, highly idiomatic, though by no means 
completely fixed, units:20 
(8) (a) “I found/ *caught/ *encountered John gone/ out of sight/ absent/ 
*left/ *departed/ *travelled away” 
(b) “They found/ *sensed/ *experienced her missing/ *disappearing/ 
*disappeared” 
(c) “They saw/*glimpsed/*watched/*looked at a book missing” 
 
3. Under a complex predicate analysis, in which both the matrix verb and the 
XP (i.e. FIND-GONE, HAVE-MISSING), rather than the matrix verb alone, 
semantically select the NP2, a number of semantic features concerning the 
selection of the NP2 receive a much more natural interpretation, such as (i) 
the unacceptability of expletives (e.g. empty “it” or existential “there”), and 
                                                     
20  At a higher level of delicacy, it can be claimed that the matrix verbs allowed to occur as 
complex-predicates in this frame are light verbs (e.g.  find, have, see) without an agentive (i.e. 
intentional) reading, which would explain the acceptability contrasts in (8c) above. See 
Gonzálvez (2001) for an outline of the relevance of this parameter in shaping configurations 
of the type “I found myself walking”. 
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(ii) the selectional restrictions concerning the XP. 
 
(9) (a) * “I found there missing” :: “I found there to be missing a book” 
(b) “I found/saw John gone/absent”:: “I found/saw my money 
missing/gone/*absent”:: “I found such evidence lacking/*gone” 
 
4. At a syntactic level, evidence from extraction, and the unacceptable 
results yielded by the application of topicalization and pseudo-clefting seem 
to point to a complex predicate analysis as being more adequate than a 
clausal one. Thus, consider (10)-(12) below:21 
 
(10) (a) “What did you find?”:: # “John gone” (EXTRACTION) 
(a´) “Who did you find gone?:: “John” 
(b) “What do you have?”:: *“a tooth missing” 
(b´) “What do you have missing?:: “A tooth” 
 
(11) (a) *“Gone is how I found John” (TOPICALIZATION) 
(b) *“Missing is how I have a tooth” 
 
(12) (a) # “What I found was John gone”:: “The person/The one I found 
missing was John” (PSEUDO-CLEFTING) 
 (b) # “What I have is a tooth missing”:: “What I have missing is a 
tooth” 
 
In addition, the complex predicate analysis fits in well with the fact 
that  the XP is often found adjacent to the matrix verb, as shown in (13) and 
(14) below: 
 
(13)  “…One of the things I´ve found missing this evening is the specific    
things that people would like to see in this playhouse …” (BNC 
Corpus, D91: 569) 
                                                     
21 Additional support for a complex predicate analysis comes from cross-linguistic 
evidence from Romance languages such as Spanish, Italian or French, where configurations 
such as “I have a tooth missing” appear to function as intransitive complex predicates: “Mi 
manca un dente” (Italian),  “Me falta un diente” (Spanish), “Il me manque une dent” (French), 
and so forth. 
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(14) “Well, I don´t really want an electric one, I can see missing a hole on 
here …”(BNC Corpus, KDM: 8500) 
 
 Consequently, the following informal generalization can be made: 
THE XP IMPLICATURE INTRUSION PRINCIPLE: If the XP in a 
secondary predication instance [NP1 V NP2 XP] can be conventionally taken 
to cancel the implication of the [NP1 V NP2] string, the V and the XP 
together can then be regarded, both syntactically and semantically, as a 
complex predicate [V XP]v taking the NP2 as its object argument. 
Such a principle ultimately shows that semantics, pragmatics and 
syntax do interwave in unexpected, though by no means chaotic, ways  in the 
production and interpretation of sentences in a given discourse scenario. 
And, what is even more important, that principle provides substantial 
evidence against assigning a uniform syntactico-semantic analysis to 
configurations like the ones in (15)-(18) below: 
  
(15)  “And I mean it, I find that really horrendous!” (BNC Corpus, FL6 
171)  [+> I think something about that, namely, that it is horrendous] 
 
(16)  “…Almost all the methods and conventions of art and life found 
their highest expression in parody” (BNC Corpus, A05 502) [+> 
Almost all the methods and conventions of art and life found their 
highest expression somewhere, namely, in parody]  
 
(17) “…All have found themselves caught up in the nightmare that is the 
US capital law system.” (BNC Corpus, A03 696) [+> All have found 
themselves in a specific situation, namely, in the nightmare that is 
the US capital law system] 
 
(18)  “It is not uncommon to find cycles missing in proximal areas…” 
(ICE-GB Corpus, W2A-023-93) [+> It is not uncommon to fail to 
find cycles in proximal areas…] 
 
Thus, despite their formal resemblance, which is evidenced by the 
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fact that  these can be taken to be instantiations of secondary predication, the 
italicised units in (18) above differ from those in (15)-(17) in one important 
respect, namely, in their failing to qualify as either complements/modifiers 
and/or adjuncts of the matrix verb. It is only by making appeal to pragmatic 
information in general and implicature in particular that we can begin to 
understand their true syntactico-semantic behaviour as complex predicates 
which select the postverbal NP2 as their sole object argument. 
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